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INTRODUCTION 
 In 1984, the English scientist Alec Jeffery discovered the variable DNA 
markers that exist within every person.1  Within a year, the English police 
became the first law enforcement agency to use DNA’s identification 
capabilities to successfully catch a criminal.2  The technique crossed the pond 
to the United States and was soon followed by the creation of a national DNA 
profile database in 1990.3  At first, the database was just for sex offenders.  
Then it was for all felons, then convicted criminals, and now even arrestees.4  
Additionally, some local DNA databases, which lack the regulations and 
restrictions that federal law imposes on the national database, include 
witnesses, victims, family members of victims, and helpful citizens who 
responded to DNA dragnets.5  This power creep has continued as law 
enforcement agencies expand the DNA identification technique’s reach ever 
further with the implementation of familial searches, which capture individuals 
with genetic relation to a DNA profile in the database.6 
 
∗  J.D. 2020, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; B.A. Political Science, Legal Studies, 
Economics, 2016, Northwestern University.  Special thanks to Professor David Rudovsky, Dr. 
Stella Tsirka, Dr. Michael Frohman, (soon to be Dr.) Maddie O’Brien, and the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for their support and wisdom.  Sorry Mom, this is the 
closest I’m getting to science. 
 1 The History of Genetic Fingerprinting, U. OF LEICESTER, https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/
genetics/jeffreys/history-gf (last visited Mar. 7, 2019) (documenting the discovery of DNA). 
 2 Id.   
 3 David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial Searching”, 50 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 123-24 (2013). 
 4 Jason Kreag, Going Local: The Fragmentation of Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1491, 1527 
(2015). 
 5 Kaye, supra note 3, at 111. 
 6 Id.  Power creep is when a technology becomes increasingly powerful over time.  In the present 
instance, the speed, accuracy, cost effectiveness, breadth of use, and ability to analyze DNA has 
drastically increased since 1985. 
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 While commentators have begun confronting the constitutional and 
public policy implications of DNA profile databases7 and familial searches,8 
new titans of DNA storage have emerged: commercial DNA databases.  
Companies such as 23andMe and Ancestry have vast DNA banks collected 
from individuals voluntarily for non-law enforcement purposes.  By April 
2020, 23andMe and Ancestry had roughly 10 and 16 million customers, 
respectively.9  Smaller companies such as MyHeritage, Family Tree DNA, 
National Geographic, and many others only add to this monumental 
resource.10  The incredible number of DNA profiles in these databases 
combined with the new familial search technique could subject vast amounts 
of the American populace to genetic surveillance.  Indeed, these companies 
have already been subpoenaed on multiple occasions by law enforcement and 
in some cases have already volunteered to work with them.11   
In what follows, this comment will explore the constitutional and privacy 
issues surrounding commercial DNA databases, ultimately concluding that 
despite the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the third-party doctrine, it should 
not be unconstitutional for law enforcement to use the genetic profiles in 
commercial databases without a warrant, though the companies might have a 
colorable argument for requiring a pre-compliance review before producing 
any records.  Part I of this comment will describe the science behind DNA 
testing and familial searches and the structure of the federal DNA database.  
Part II will examine the constitutionality of DNA databases and searches as 
well as the constitutionality of familial searches, ultimately concluding that both 
pass constitutional muster.  Part III will discuss the factual and legal framework 
needed to analyze commercial DNA databases.  Part IV will analyze the 
constitutionality and practicality of police use of commercial DNA databases.  
Finally, this comment will conclude with the potential implications of 
 
7 Id.  
8 Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309 
(2010). 
9     About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 1, 
2020); Company Overview, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-
ancestry/company-facts (last visited Apr. 1, 2020). 
 10 Ruth Padawer, Sigrid Johnson Was Black. A DNA Test Said She Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/19/magazine/dna-test-black-
family.html?action=click&module=Editors%20Picks&pgtype=Homepage (describing the size of 
DNA companies).  
 11 Salvador Hernandez, One of the Biggest At-Home DNA Testing Companies is Working With the 
FBI, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/
family-tree-dna-fbi-investigative-genealogy-privacy?utm_term=.bwr4RbeLnw#.bwr4RbeLnw 
(reporting that FamilyTree has opened up its database to the FBI).  
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unbridled genetic surveillance and a call to Congress to enact uniform 
regulations across federal, state, and local databases.12 
I.  WHAT IS DNA AND HOW DOES LAW ENFORCEMENT USE IT? 
To properly understand the developments in DNA identification and the 
distinction between individual and familial searches it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the scientific and institutional framework that exists in the 
United States.   
A.  The Science of DNA Identification 
Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, is the building block of human genetic 
code and can be found in every human cell.13  DNA is made up of four 
chemical bases: adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine, which are assembled 
into the iconic double helix structure.14  Each cell contains twenty-three pairs 
of chromosomes, which are long chains of DNA bases (nucleotides), half of 
which are passed down from each parent to their child.15  For our purposes, 
there are two types of relevant DNA; mitochondrial and nuclear.16  
Mitochondrial DNA is a specific type of DNA that contains one small 
circular chromosome and is found in the mitochondria, the powerhouse of 
the cell.17  Mitochondrial DNA makes up less than 1% of one’s total DNA, 
but is unique in that it is passed down solely from the mother.18  While 
mitochondrial searches are not as specific or accurate as the more common 
nuclear DNA search method, the technique allows for a broader reach as each 
maternal relative will have the exact same sequence.19  This means that while 
it generally does not have the reliability required for criminal trials, it can be 
helpful for police investigations.20  Mitochondrial DNA is also much more 
suitable for crime scene investigations where the DNA has partially degraded 
 
 12 Kreag, supra note 4, at 1498.  
 13 See Kaye, supra note 3, at 114 (explaining the structure of DNA). 
 14 See Elizabeth Stewart Tanaka, Can You Protect Your DNA When Your Family Does Not? An 
Analysis of Familial DNA Usage in Criminal Investigations, 12 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 115, 118 
(2008) (explaining the science behind DNA structure). 
 15 Id. at 118.  
 16 Id. at 118. 
 17 Philip Siekevitz, Powerhouse of the Cell, 197 SCI. AM. 131 (1957), 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24940890?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents (detailing the purpose of 
mitochondria).  
 18 Tanaka, supra note 14, at 120.  
 19 Id. at 121. 
 20 Id. at 121.  
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because mass amounts of copies of mitochondrial DNA exist in each cell.  In 
contrast, with nuclear DNA, a scientist would need to find another intact cell 
in order to string together a missing sequence.21  However, mitochondrial 
DNA searches are mostly still a developing science for which the full potential 
remains to be realized.22 
Nuclear DNA makes up the majority of one’s DNA and is what is 
primarily used by law enforcement.  Within nuclear DNA, about 2-3% 
contains genes or coding DNA.23  This is how one might get their mother’s 
eyes or their father’s Huntington’s disease.  The other 98% of the DNA was 
long thought to serve no functional purpose and was thus popularly termed 
“junk” DNA, although more recent studies have shown that much of it has 
roles in regulating how the coding regions are used.24  This “junk” DNA is 
what is primarily used for identification.25  In total, each person has about three 
billion chemical base pairs that, in a string, form sequences to create genes.26  
The order of the chemical bases (A, C, G, T) in nuclear DNA is mostly the 
same from individual to individual, but some locations contain difference 
sequences.27  The sequence difference at a specific location is referred to as an 
allele.28  The variations and patterns in the sequences, or polymorphisms, 
create the ability to uniquely identify individuals.29  The most popular type of 
polymorphism for DNA identification purposes is the short-tandem repeat, 
or STR, named for the several short patterns of repeated chemical base pairs 
in a row.  STRs vary widely in length and copy number among people; thus, 
if enough STRs are looked at, each person will have a unique set of specific 
STRs. 
The FBI standard, used in the federal database, CODIS, compares 
sequences at thirteen locations (loci), using a total of twenty-six alleles for the 
search.30  A comparison of two DNA samples’ alleles’ STR patterns at those 
 
 21 Id. at 122–23 (“Degraded evidence is more likely to contain mtDNA capable of being sequenced 
partly because of the hundreds to thousands of copies of mtDNA in each cell as opposed to the two 
copies of nucDNA. The sheer volume of mtDNA in each cell increases the likelihood of finding 
DNA that is suitable for analysis in otherwise compromised evidence.”). 
 22 Id. at 121. 
 23 Julie Agueros, Liberty, Justice, and Technology: Why Familial DNA Searches Must Confront the 
Rigor of the American Political Process, 48 No. 4 CRIM. L. BULLETIN Art. 6 (2012). 
 24 Id. at 6. 
 25 Id. at 6. 
 26 Tanaka, supra note14, at 118.  
 27 Kaye, supra note 3, at 115. 
 28 Id. at 115. 
 29 Id. at 115.  
 30 Id. at 119.  
 
August 2020] 23POLICEMENANDME 1499 
loci can determine whether the DNA comes from the same source.31  Exact, 
complete matches between the crime scene DNA and the suspect’s DNA 
mean that it is overwhelmingly likely that the suspect’s DNA was present at 
the crime scene.32  Similarly, anything but an exact match clears that suspect’s 
DNA from the crime scene sample.33  However, a close match, deemed a 
partial match, indicates that the suspect might share a genetic kinship with the 
crime scene DNA.  The closer the match, the higher the probability that the 
two samples are related.34  
There are three types of relevant matches: First, full matches, where the 
database profile contains every allele from the crime scene DNA, thus making 
the profile a suspect.35  Second, partial matches, where the database profile 
contains alleles not found in the crime scene DNA, due to a variety of reasons 
such as a muddled sample, making the profile and its genetic relatives suspects.  
Third, familial matches, where the DNA profile differs from the crime scene 
sample in a way that clears the database inhabitant from suspicion, but makes 
it very probable that the inhabitant has a relative outside the database who was 
the source.36  For now, due to the number of alleles tested, the familial match 
DNA analysis is only effective for close relations; parent-child, or full sibling 
relationships.37 
With respect to the potential power of familial searches, a 1996 study 
reported that half of all inmates surveyed said they had close family members 
who had been incarcerated.38  This is probably an underestimate of the 
technique’s potential reach considering there are inmates’ relatives who 
committed crimes and were not convicted as well as people's tendency to 
underreport bad behavior.39  While it’s impossible to measure the technique’s 
efficacy in the real world, as the databases grow, both due to more people 
committing crimes and more actions being deemed worthy of DNA collection 
(recall the power creep of sex crimes to felonies, to crimes, to arrestees), its 
 
 31 Id. at 116. 
 32 Id. at 116. 
 33 Id. at 116. 
 34 Id. at 116.  This is different from “the closer the match, the more closely the two DNA samples are 
related.” While this might be true, it is not what DNA identification is testing for. 
 35 Id. at 121.  
 36 Id. at 121.  
 37 Id. at 120.  
 38 Id. at 123.  
 39 Nicole J. Olynk Widmar et al., Social Desirability Bias in Reporting of Holiday Season 
Healthfulness, PREVENTATIVE MED. REPORTS, Dec. 2016, at 270–76, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4942737/ (finding that social desirability bias causes 
people to underreport bad behavior, even in the benign context of holiday health habits).   
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range will only broaden.40  Similarly, as the science behind DNA analysis 
improves and databases begin adding more alleles to the profiles, the 
technique itself will become more refined and more powerful.41 
B.  CODIS, the Federal DNA Database 
CODIS, the Combined DNA Index System, is the federal database for 
DNA profiles. It was created in 1990 by the FBI42 with the purpose of tracking 
sex offenders, but has since expanded drastically.43  It is available to any 
approved law enforcement agency and has resulted in a massive number of 
hits and leads in cases.44  As of March 2018, there are more than fourteen 
million known individuals in the database, and it has survived all legal 
challenges.45  The CODIS database links all federal, state, and local 
databases.46  It has two sections, the Forensic Index, which contains crime 
scene samples, and the Offender Index, which contains DNA from 
individuals compelled to provide genetic samples.47  When CODIS was 
enacted, it was accompanied by a number of regulations regarding quality of 
the DNA sample, privacy concerns, and protocols regarding the expungement 
of profiles.48 
The federal database is restricted by a regulatory framework enacted to 
protect privacy and shield it from legal challenges.49  Such regulations include 
regular audits, a prohibition on familial searches, limited comparison abilities 
with partial matches, the removal of a DNA profile if the case is overturned 
or the arrestee dismissed, and the removal of consensual DNA samples, which 
are typically given by victims or suspects.50  Additionally, the national labs can 
take up to a month to confirm a match and twelve months to create a profile.51  
These regulations limit the efficacy of the federal database, leading some 
 
 40 Kaye, supra note 3, at 123. 
 41 Id. at 124.  
 42 See Amanda Pattock, Note, It’s All Relative: Familial DNA Testing and the Fourth Amendment, 12 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 851, 856 (2011) (noting the creation of CODIS).  
 43 Suter, supra note 8, at 317.  
 44 Pattock, supra note 42, at 858.  
 45 Kreag, supra note 4, at 1494.  
 46 Suter, supra note 8, at 316.  
 47 Id.  The DNA Identification Act of 1994 carves out “DNA samples that are voluntarily submitted 
solely for elimination purposes” from being stored in the Index.  42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006).  
However, “samples voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing persons” are permitted to be 
stored.  See Suter, supra note 8, at 315. 
 48 Pattock, supra note 42, at 857. 
 49 Kreag, supra note 4, at 1502.  
 50 Id.  
 51 Id.  
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commentators to criticize it as ineffective, arguing that because it mostly 
contains violent offenders’ DNA who are already in prison, it is redundant.52  
C.  Local Databases 
State and local databases are not limited by these restrictions. The 
regulations on these databases are determined by the state legislature or in 
some cases, the self-regulation of the law enforcement agency.53  This is 
problematic as law enforcement success is commonly measured by crime rates 
and clearance rates, so there is little incentive for the police to limit their 
investigative abilities.54  
The first local database was started in Palm Bay, Florida, after a private 
DNA company approached the local police department in 2006.55  Within six 
months, the database contained 1400 profiles, burglary rates had decreased, 
and clearance rates had increased.56  The success of Palm Bay led to the spread 
of local databases, and by 2013, the other police departments in Florida had 
created their own databases and merged them with Palm Bay’s database, 
creating a database of 13,000 profiles within a year.57  
Local databases are typically characterized by aggressive collection of 
crime scene DNA.58  This is typified by the index splits; the federal database 
is made up of about 94% offender profiles and 6% crime scene samples.59  In 
contrast, the database for Bensalem, Pennsylvania has about a 50/50 split 
between forensic and offender data.60  What this indicates is a focus on DNA 
searches for less serious crimes.61  At the state level there are typically less 
restrictions on the databases than the federal system. For instance, one of the 
reasons Arizona developed its own state database was specifically for familial 
searches,62 and Alabama and Michigan have authorized the retention and 
collection of DNA samples for medical research.63  Notably in contrast, 
 
 52 Id. at 1503.  
 53 Id.  
 54 Id. at 1498.  
 55 Id. at 1507. 
 56 Id. at 1509.  
 57 Id. at 1510.  
 58 See, e.g., id. at 1513 (describing the collection practices of the Bensalem, Pennsylvania township 
where DNA collection from suspects is typical). 
 59 Id. at 1512. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See, e.g., id. (describing increased efforts to collect DNA in conjunction with property crimes).  
 62 Id. at 1532–33. 
 63 Suter, supra note 8, at 335.  
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Vermont banned non-federal databases and Maryland and Washington D.C. 
have banned familial searches.64  However, most states in fact do not have 
formal regulations and policies, leaving local law enforcement agencies to 
decide their approach and defend it in court.65 
Moving forward, DNA identification techniques are only going to become 
faster and more powerful.66  Recent advances in testing have allowed scientists 
to gain more information from less DNA, both in terms of damaged samples 
and from new sources such as skin cells or saliva.67  Tests are becoming faster 
and cheaper, and federal funding is increasingly going to local databases.68  
Finally, just as the Palm Bay local DNA database was jumpstarted by a 
corporate pitch, more companies are seeing law enforcement as a revenue 
stream and expanding their DNA testing and databanks.69 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHES 
A.  The Constitutionality of DNA Databases and Searches 
From their inception, DNA banks have been challenged in court, typically 
under the Fourth Amendment.70  However they have survived all legal 
challenges, even as they expanded in reach and power.71  Courts typically 
balance the intrusiveness and personal nature of DNA against a totality-of-the-
circumstances, “reasonableness” of the search and the special needs of law 
enforcement to identify suspects and lower recidivism.72  
 
 64 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (LexisNexis 2020); D.C. Code Ann. §218.2(b) (West 
2001). 
 65 Suter, supra note 8, at 336–37. 
 66 See Heather Murphy, Coming Soon to a Police Station Near You: The DNA ‘Magic Box’, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/science/dna-crime-gene-
technology.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage (commenting on the 
development of Magic Box, a new DNA technology).  
 67 Kreag, supra note 4, at 1504. 
 68 Id. at 1504–05. 
 69 Id. at 1506.  
 70 DNA evidence has never been held to be self-incrimination and worthy of Fifth Amendment 
protections.  See United States v. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (finding that physical 
evidence such as blood is not testimonial or communicative in nature and as such is not protected by 
the right against self-incrimination).  However, the extraction of bodily materials is a search and, 
therefore, must be considered reasonable in order to be constitutional.  Id. at 767–68. 
 71 Osagie K. Obasogie, The Dangers of Growing DNA Databases, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2010), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-apr-09-la-oe-obasogie9-2010apr09-story.html (noting 
that 18 states had enacted legislation permitting the collection of DNA from arrestees); Kaye, supra 
note 3, at 130.  
 72 Suter, supra note 8, at 329–30.  
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The Fourth Amendment requires that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause . . . .”73  Courts have interpreted the role of this 
amendment to protect privacy and regulate police action.  All Fourth 
Amendment analyses must begin with the threshold question of what 
constitutes a search or seizure, because if the conduct in question is not a 
search or seizure, then the protections of the Fourth Amendment do not 
apply.74  The examination typically proceeds either as a reasonable expectation 
of privacy or a property analysis.  In Katz, the Court laid out the first of these 
paths, holding that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject 
to Fourth Amendment protection.75  However, what that person seeks to 
preserve as private may be constitutionally protected if the person had a 
subjective belief of privacy in that area and society is willing the recognize that 
belief as reasonable.76  The other method of recognizing a search is through a 
property analysis, typified by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Jardines, 
which held that police trespass onto the accused’s tangible property was an 
unreasonable search and therefore a Fourth Amendment violation.77  
Once a court has determined that a warrantless search and seizure has 
occurred, it must determine whether the search was either reasonable or in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Illustrative of this fault line with respect 
to DNA searches is Maryland v. King.78  In 2008, the Maryland legislature 
authorized the expansion of its database by allowing the police to conduct a 
cheek swab of any suspect charged with a violent crime.79  There were some 
protections if the suspect was ultimately not convicted, but the trigger for the 
sample collection was an arrest.80  The defendant, King, was swabbed and 
matched to an unsolved break-in and rape, prompting the legal challenge.81  
King argued that the swab was inarguably a search and unconstitutional as it 
was looking for evidence of a different crime without any reasonable 
 
 73 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 74 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).  
 75 Id. at 351. 
 76 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 77 Florida. v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013).  
 78 Maryland. v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013).  
 79 Id. at 443. 
 80 Id. at 441.  
 81 Id. 
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individualized suspicion, distinguishable from a search incident to arrest.82  
However, the Supreme Court upheld the Maryland statute using a 
reasonableness analysis that balanced the defendant’s privacy concerns with 
the government’s interest in law enforcement.83  While Court agreed that the 
swab was a search, it was minimally intrusive and arrested persons had a 
lowered expectation of privacy.  
Additionally, the Court held that the primary purpose of the DNA search 
was identification, which was a special need beyond pure law enforcement, as 
it had implications for bail and the suspect’s threat to the officers.84  
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent, pointing out the various problems 
with the majority’s special needs rationale, notably that identification took far 
too long to be practical for the threat or bail arguments.85  However, even 
assuming that Scalia was right, and that the majority’s rationale is significantly 
weakened, King demonstrates that the utility of DNA had such a powerful 
effect on the Court that it was willing to be flexible with the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
This primary purpose argument is known as the “special needs” exception.  
When the government has “special needs” beyond the typical law 
enforcement context, and is investigating for purposes other than law 
enforcement, situations can be balanced to uphold non-probable cause 
searches, sometimes without individualized suspicion, even if what they do 
results in criminal liability.  One powerful special need that courts have found 
for DNA databases beyond identification86 and reducing recidivism87 is closure 
for victims.  In United States v. Kincaid, the Ninth Circuit held that “by 
contributing to the solution of past crimes, DNA profiling of qualified federal 
offenders helps bring closure to countless victims of crime who long have 
languished in the knowledge that perpetrators remain at large.”  Upholding 
 
 82 Brief for Respondent at 21, Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (No. 12-207) (2013) (“so too has 
[the State] failed to establish any level of individualized suspicion that would have justified the search 
of respondent”).   
 83 King, 569 U.S. at 448.  
 84 Id. at 453.  
 85 Id. at 471–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The truth, known to Maryland and increasingly to the reader: 
this search had nothing to do with establishing King’s identity.”).  
 86 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (finding that a police checkpoint conducting suspicionless 
searches in response to a hit-and-run was primarily information-seeking and not a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 87 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (“Ewing’s sentence is justified by the State’s public-
safety interest in . . . deterring recidivist felons.”).  
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the use of DNA profiling, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “together, the 
weight of these interests is monumental.”88 
B.  The Spread of Familial DNA Searches 
Recall that a standard DNA test compares the chemical base sequences at 
thirteen loci of crime scene DNA to a database inhabitant’s profile and that a 
perfect match will have identical sequences at those thirteen loci.89  If no 
perfect matches are found, law enforcement can order what is known as a 
familial search.  The FBI defines a familial search as a “second deliberate 
search [of a DNA database] in order to identify close biological relatives of the 
perpetrator in the known offender database,” which is only to be used after a 
failed initial match.90  In this case, the offender database is searched not for a 
perfect thirteen-loci match, but for a partial match such as an eight-loci match, 
which would suggest a close biological relative.91  This two-step process for a 
familial match removes about 99% of non-related DNA profiles.92  The FBI’s 
definition has been criticized though, as partial matches are sometimes found 
(and then used) inadvertently, rendering the “deliberate search” definition too 
narrow.93  Additionally, familial searches have been maligned as they are 
functionally searches based on genetic association rather than due to 
individualized suspicion or a conviction.94  Not all uses of familial DNA 
searches are controversial however.  The technique has been used in instances 
of child support, missing persons cases, and even for the confirmation that 
Osama Bin Landen was the man the Navy SEALS killed.95 
Just as England kickstarted the DNA identification movement in the 1980s 
that eventually made its way over to the United States, in 2003, England was 
the first county to formally authorize familial searches.96  England’s diminished 
notion of privacy has placed it at the forefront of the power creep that has 
characterized the movement.97  England was the first country to allow for the 
 
 88 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 89 Suter, supra note 8, at 319.  
 90 Id. at 324.  
 91 Id. at 319–20. 
 92 Agueros, supra note 23.  
 93 Suter, supra note 8, at 324.  
 94 Id. at 358.  
 95 Kaye, supra note 3, at 113–14. 
 96 Suter, supra note 8, at 324.  
 97 See Frederick Bieber & David Lazer, Guilt by Association, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 23, 2004, at 20 
(noting that the U.K. “became the first country to permit the DNA profile of anyone arrested to be 
kept indefinitely, regardless of whether they are subsequently convicted”). 
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retention of arrestee DNA samples, regardless of subsequent conviction, and 
the familial search technique there is both widespread and uncontroversial.98  
The technique has found success in England, getting credited for solving at 
least nine cases by 2005.99  By 2006, the technique gained limited acceptance 
in the U.S., with the FBI permitting CODIS familial searches as a last resort.100  
At the local level, some regions are conducting familial searches in an informal 
manner, leading one study to declare a “startling lack of transparency in 
rulemaking.”101  However, other jurisdictions have demonstrated 
apprehension towards the constitutional and privacy concerns concerning 
familial searching, waiting for express directive from their legislatures before 
engaging in the practice.102 
The expansion of DNA search power and the allure of familial searches 
cannot be denied.103  Due to the correlation between poverty, neighborhoods, 
and crime (not to mention any psychological factors), there is a high instance 
of crime running in a family, with “one study show[ing] that thirty percent of 
inmates had brothers who were also incarcerated, and another that ‘nearly half 
of jail inmates had at least one close relative who had been incarcerated.’”104  
Familial searches could effectively double or triple the size of the DNA 
database and allow for police to use volunteered DNA from a suspect’s family 
if the suspect refuses to provide a sample and they cannot get a court order.105  
Additionally, familial searches have been used to revive cold cases106 and 
exonerate long-imprisoned people.107  For instance, police caught the prolific 
“Bind, Torture, Kill” serial killer, Dennis Rader, by analyzing DNA submitted 
by his daughter.108  The technique was also famously used to catch the “Grim 
Sleeper,” a Los Angeles-based serial killer who committed his murders over 
the course of thirty years.109  In this case, the police partially matched DNA 
 
 98 See Duncan Carling, Note, Less Privacy Please, We’re British: Investigating Crime with DNA in the 
U.K. and the U.S., 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 487, 495 (2008) (noting that arrestee 
sampling is “an accepted and widespread practice in the U.K.”). 
 99 Suter, supra note 8, at 324–25.  
 100 Id. at 325–26.  
 101 Id. at 326. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 318 n.51 (“President Obama has even recently called for arrestees to have their DNA 
collected and stored in the national database.”). 
104 Suter, supra note 8, at 321. 
105 Id. at 320–21.  
106 Pattock, supra note 42, at 852.  
107 Lina Hogan, Note, Fourth Amendment - Guilt by Relation: If Your Brother is Convicted of a Crime, 
You Too May Do Time, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 543, 549–50 (2008).  
108 Suter, supra note 8, at 320.  
109 Pattock, supra note 42, at 851–52.  
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found on a victim to Christopher Franklin, who was caught on a weapons 
charge a year prior.110  Since Franklin was born after the first of the Grim 
Sleeper’s killings, detectives investigated his more appropriately-aged family 
members, eventually using DNA collected from a thrown out pizza to find a 
perfect match with Franklin’s father, solving the cold case.111  And just as 
traditional DNA searching has exonerated an estimated 212 people, familial 
searching freed Darryl Hunt after an eighteen-year imprisonment when the 
brother of the true killer turned up in a CODIS search.112  Surely, as familial 
searching and DNA databases become more powerful, these stories will 
become the norm rather than the newsworthy.  
C.  The Constitutionality of Familial DNA Searches 
Despite the highlighted successes of familial DNA searches, it is 
understandable why the technique has caused some law enforcement agencies 
to wait for express authorization.  As Justice Breyer wrote, “DNA 
identification may raise privacy concerns.  Suppose a check of a convict DNA 
database reveals a near miss, thereby implicating a relative who has no record 
of conviction and was consequently not included in the bank.  What kind of 
legal rules should apply?”113  No court has tested the technique thus far, but 
commentators have pointed to the policy implications, Fourth Amendment, 
and Fourteenth Amendment as potentially raising issues.114   
Consider a case where police retrieve DNA from a crime scene, run it 
through the offender database, and do not find a match.  Next, they conduct 
a second query, a familial search (search A), which leads to a partial match to 
a person who has been incarcerated for ten years and thus could not have 
committed the crime.  Then, the officers investigate the family members of 
the partial match, just as they did with the Grim Sleeper, and attempt to 
compel them into giving a DNA sample (search B).  Could the DNA be 
compelled without individualized probable cause?  
 
110     Id. at 152. 
 111 Id. at 852.  Courts have held that a person has no privacy interest in their discarded DNA as it has 
been abandoned.  See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that a person had 
no privacy interest in their trash); see also Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2007) (holding that police scrapping spit off a sidewalk was not a Fourth Amendment 
violation).  
 112 Hogan, supra note 107, at 549, 552.  
 113 Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2009), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2009/03/genetic-surveillance-for-all.html (discussing Justice Breyer’s foreword in a book on 
justice and technology).  
 114 Kaye, supra note 3, at 112, 125, 129.  
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Framing familial searches through a reasonableness test like that  of 
Maryland v. King leads to a much closer balancing test. 115  Familial searches 
are distinct from the traditional DNA search because the people who the 
search is targeted at are not in custody; they have no diminished expectation 
of privacy, nor is there an interest in preventing their recidivism.  Plainly, they 
suffer increased police scrutiny based on their relatives’ past involvement with 
the criminal justice system.116  Regarding search A, we are considering the 
database inhabitant’s interest in not having his DNA be used to track his 
family.117  While finding standing could be an issue (in the absence of 
compulsion of DNA), the information revealed during these investigations 
could lead to significant embarrassment and emotional injury in instances 
where genetic relations differ from social relations, notably in cases of 
adoption, adultery, incest, or assisted pregnancy.118  This information could 
come to light inadvertently, or police could use it as leverage to pressure a 
person into revealing information.119   
Additionally, the “special needs” rationale relied on by the King Court is 
significantly weakened in this instance.  Familial searches serve purely law 
enforcement purposes, there is no threat to the officers nor any bail 
considerations to take into account.  While the practice might have a broader 
social purpose, and as courts have noted, could provide a potential familial 
deterrent effect,120 this is unlikely to fulfil the special needs requirement.121  In 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court held that a hospital’s policy 
of giving diagnostic medical records to a forensic lab served no special 
purpose.  The Court reasoned that “[b]ecause law enforcement involvement 
always serves some broader social purpose or objective, under respondents’ 
view, virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized 
under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its 
ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose.”122  Similarly here, the secondary 
query and DNA collection serves no special interest beyond aiding the law 
 
 115 See Hogan, supra note 107, at 580 (discussing balancing test that utilizes reasonableness and totality 
of the circumstances framework).  
 116 Suter, supra note 8, at 349.  
 117 The family members would not have a claim because they have no privacy interest in another 
individual’s DNA. 
118 Suter, supra note 8, at 343.  
119 Id. at 345.  
120  Once the practice becomes societally known, people will be aware that they are more likely to be 
caught if someone in their family has been arrested. 
 121 Pattock, supra note 42, at 868.  
 122 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001). 
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enforcement investigation, and therefore its permissibility must rely purely on 
a reasonableness balancing test.  
Balancing societal interests against an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights will likely result in the permissibility of familial searches.  Maryland v. 
King and subsequent cases have shown just how favored DNA searches and 
databases are with respect to a balancing test. 123  If a court must balance the 
reasonableness of the search against its intrusive nature, then when taking into 
account the aforementioned successes in cold cases and exonerations, the 
societal interest will likely win out.124  With respect to the “family secrets” 
argument, there would need to be a showing that familial searching is 
somehow more damaging and more likely to reveal information than other 
legal police investigatory methods.125  Due to the success stories, the 
exonerations, and the legal precedents, a court is likely to find that under the 
totality of the circumstances, familial searching is not unreasonable.126 
With respect to search B, in order for the police to use a partial match 
to compel production of DNA from family members, courts will require a 
warrant, and it is unclear whether the partial match alone will satisfy the 
probable cause standard.  The collection of the DNA is undeniably a search, 
and the Court has shown an interest in protecting bodily integrity.127  This is 
doubly true when the information gleaned has the potential to contain 
valuable and compromising private medical facts.128  However, familial 
searches rely on the same “junk” DNA STR search that traditional DNA 
searches rely on,129 meaning that they are unlikely to trigger the additional 
privacy protections that a court might provide for medical secrets.130  Once 
again, there are no special needs when it comes to compelling DNA from 
family members not under arrest and no apparent exigency exists.  
Therefore, if the police attempt to compel DNA production from an 
 
 123 See Maryland. v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 460 (2013) (holding that DNA searches are akin to fingerprint 
identification). 
 124 See Pattock, supra note 42, at 864 (referencing Supreme Court cases where societal interest won out 
over individual privacy in cases of mandatory DNA collection and retention).  
 125 Kaye, supra note 3, at 145.  
 126 In United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th 
Cir. 2011) the 9th Circuit seemed to indicate it was unconcerned with any constitutional issues 
stemming from this aspect of DNA retention (“It is questionable whether the person … whose familial 
comparison helped focus the inquiry, has suffered any invasion of his or her constitutional right to 
privacy.”). 
 127 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 128 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec.’s Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (noting how chemical analysis of 
urine can reveal facts about whether a person is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic). 
 129 See infra Part III.B (“The FBI defines a familial search as a ‘second deliberate search of a DNA 
database.’”). 
 130 Supra Part II.B. 
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individual solely on the basis of a partial match, a court should require a 
warrant to be issued and must determine whether a partial match is sufficient 
to support a probable cause standard.  This determination is likely 
dependent on the reliability of the query and the likelihood that the family 
member is the perpetrator. 131 
Finally, familial searches could be challenged under a Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection claim.  It’s fairly clear that familial searches will 
have a disparate impact on certain communities, both racial and religious.132  
28.5% of African-American men, 16% of Hispanic men, and 4.4% of white 
men will be convicted of a felony at some point during their life.133  The 
disparate impact from these numbers will be additionally exacerbated by 
racially disparate arrest rates, which will also potentially place arrestees’ DNA 
in a database.  Their DNA will be added to a database that was not intended 
for familial searches when it was created, subjecting the arrestees and their 
families to lifelong genetic surveillance.  Additionally, certain groups like 
Mormons, Hispanics, and low-income people tend to have larger families 
“and are therefore will be more vulnerable familial searches.”134  However, this 
disparate impact is unlikely to be enough to trigger strict scrutiny, and the law 
enforcement interests are surely sufficient to justify a rational basis. 
The case that would generally control this issue is Washington v. Davis.135  
In that case, black applicants were rejected from becoming police officers 
because they failed a written test.136  The unsuccessful black applicants brought 
a class action suit and won at the appellate level, with the court finding that the 
test had a racially disparate impact and was insufficiently related to job 
performance.137  However, this ruling was reversed at the Supreme Court, with 
Justice White writing that there must be proof of discriminatory intent or 
purpose in order to invalidate a government statute.138  A government action 
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it has a “racially 
 
 131 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (explaining that in order for a magistrate to issue a 
search warrant, he must evaluate the evidence under a “flexible, common-sense,” totality-of-the-
circumstances approach.  He must determine whether there is sufficient information to establish 
probable cause and his actions must be beyond a mere ratification of others’ conclusions). 
 132 Kaye, supra note 3, at 128–29.  
 133 Agueros, supra note 23.  
 134 Kaye, supra note 3, at 127.  
 135 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 136 Id. at 232. 
 137 Id. at 236. 
 138 Id. at 246–48. 
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disproportionate impact.”139  This ruling was largely grounded in practical 
logic:  
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, 
absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race 
more than another would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions 
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, 
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor 
and the average black than to more affluent white[s].140 
Washington v. Davis created an intent requirement in order to trigger strict 
scrutiny on a facially neutral government action.  The intent standard was 
further clarified in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 
wherein the Supreme Court ruled that there was no equal protection violation 
even when a neutral law had a disproportionately adverse effect on a minority 
so long as the law was not passed with a discriminatory intent.141  To be 
constitutionally improper, the legislature must have passed the law “because 
of” the disparate impact, not “in spite of” it.142  
Applying that framework to familial DNA searches, it is clear that there is 
no Fourteenth Amendment violation.  While some protected groups are 
disproportionally affected, this is a facially neutral apparatus with no racial 
animus.143  It will not trigger struct scrutiny, and the increased legitimacy and 
accuracy of DNA identification will survive a rational basis test. 
III.  THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF  
COMMERCIAL DNA DATABASES 
A. The Science Behind Commercial Databases 
In 2007, 23andMe became the first company in the world to offer 
commercial DNA testing.144  By 2011, the company had 100,000 customers 
and in 2020 it reported that it had over ten million.145  It is not alone; Ancestry, 
launched in 2012, has over sixteen million DNA profiles in its databank as of 
 
 139 Id. at 239.  
 140 Id. at 248.  
 141 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).  
 142 Id. 
 143 See Kaye, supra note 3, at 128 (arguing that discrimination and equal protection claims against the 
practice of familial searches would be “implausible.”).  
 144 About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 13, 
2019). 
 145 23andMe History, 23andMe, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/assets/timeline/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2020); About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us/ 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2020). 
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April 2020.146  To use the companies' products, customers submit their saliva 
for DNA analysis and the companies use the DNA to create individualized 
family trees, conduct medical research, and reveal medical facts about the 
customer’s genetic profile.  The companies are open to everyone and actively 
seek out underrepresented groups,147 but by their expensive and (arguably) 
impractical nature have skewed towards a wealthier, whiter clientele.148 
The companies seem to be aware of their attractive nature to law 
enforcement, with 23andMe noting that “about 80 percent [of surveyed 
Americans] said they had privacy concerns around DNA testing, much of that 
concern stems from not knowing how their data would be protected,” and that 
17 percent said privacy concerns stopped them from purchasing a test.149  
Some companies, such as Family Tree DNA, already are working with law 
enforcement, allowing FBI agents to search their database.150  The big two 
companies, Ancestry and 23andMe, however, offer a defense of customers’ 
genetic privacy even in the face of law enforcement requests.  
Ancestry has a privacy page and releases a transparency report every year.151  
Its privacy page notes that it will “share your Personal Information if [Ancestry] 
believe[s] it is reasonably necessary to comply with [a] valid legal process (e.g., 
subpoenas [or] warrants).”152  Further, the company says that while a user can 
request to have their information deleted, if they have consented to help with 
research, the data cannot be deleted.153  In 2017, Ancestry’s transparency 
report stated that it received thirty-four requests from law enforcement for user 
information; however, all of the requests were related to financial transactions 
and none asked for genetic material.154  That said, Ancestry has supplied 
 
 146 Company Overview, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/company-facts 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2020). 
 147 The African Genetics Project, 23ANDME: 23ANDMEBLOG (Oct. 12, 2016) 
https://blog.23andme.com/23andme-research/the-african-genetics-project/.  
 148 Isabelle Mencia, Why DNA Ancestry Tests are Struggling to Avoid White Bias, STUDY BREAK (Mar. 
5, 2018) https://studybreaks.com/news-politics/dna-ancestry-tests/.  
 149 National Survey Shows Strong Interest in DNA Testing, 23ANDME (Sept. 18, 2017) 
https://mediacenter.23andme.com/press-releases/national-survey-shows-strong-interest-dna-testing/. 
150 Hernandez, supra note 11. 
151 Privacy Statement Archive, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacy-archive (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2020). 
 152 Website Privacy Statement, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.ca/cs/legal/privacystatement (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
 153 Id.  
 154 Ancestry 2017 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, (Dec. 31, 2017) https://www.ancestry.ca/cs/
transparency. 
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genetic information to law enforcement in the past, notably in 2014, which led 
to a false-positive match.155 
23andMe’s privacy page claims to be “technically and legally” secure from 
law enforcement, and boasts of having never given genetic info to them.156  
Allegedly, this is because they test for a different sequence (STP) rather than 
the STR pattern that CODIS uses.157  Additionally, 23andMe claims that their 
service cannot be reliably connected to an individual in a verifiable manner 
such that it could be used in court.158  To use 23andMe, a person orders a spit-
kit and then mails their DNA sample to the company.159  Because the person 
who ordered the kit and the one who gave the sample are not necessarily the 
same person, the company claims that the DNA cannot be validated as 
belonging to the named person.160  While this does seem to be a surmountable 
issue, 23andMe maintains that they have never given information to a law 
enforcement agency.161 
B.  The Relevant Doctrines and Caselaw 
Building off of the analysis that DNA tests are permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment and that familial DNA searches would survive both 
Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment challenges, police use of 
commercial DNA databases brings with it its own set of legal issues.  
Commercial database DNA involves personal information willingly given to a 
company for non-law-enforcement purposes.  Additionally, the collected 
DNA contains not only “junk” DNA but also the “coding” DNA that contains 
the personal information needed to create a commercial genetic profile.162  
 
 155 Jennifer Lynch, How Private DNA Data Led Idaho Cops on a Wild Goose Chase and Linked an 
Innocent Man to a 20-year-old Murder Case, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 1, 2015) 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/how-private-dna-data-led-idaho-cops-wild-goose-chase-and-
linked-innocent-man-20. 
 156 Kate Black & Zerina Curevac, 23andPrivacy: Your Data and Law Enforcement, 23ANDME: 
23ANDMEBLOG (Mar. 16, 2016), https://blog.23andme.com/23andme-and-you/23andprivacy-your-
data-law-enforcement/.  
 157 Id.  
 158 Id.  
 159 Id.  
 160 Stephanie M. Lee, Cops Want to Look At 23andMe Customers’ DNA, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 21, 
2015), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/stephaniemlee/law-enforcement-is-interested-in-
23andme-user-data. 
 161 Black & Curevac, supra note 156.  
 162 DNA is composed of coding and non-coding regions. Non-coding DNA, termed “Junk” DNA is 
what is used to identify a person, but does not show more invasive characteristics like genetic traits.  
See King, 569 U.S. at 442–43.  Coding DNA is what is used by commercial companies as it contains 
the genetic traits such as ancestry and illnesses.  
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Despite all this, police use of these databases should be permissible, at least 
constitutionally, due to the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy once 
one has given away their non-essential records to a third-party.163 
In United States v. Miller, police used the defendants' bank transactions as 
evidence that they were participating in a criminal conspiracy.164  The 
defendants tried to suppress the transactions under the theory that they had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in those documents and that it was improper 
for the police to seize the paperwork without a warrant.165  The Supreme Court 
upheld the conviction, ruling that once someone has shared information with 
a third-party, they no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to that information.166  The Court additionally pointed to precedent 
supporting the notion that deposit slips are elements of commercial 
transactions and therefore unprotected.167  Also pertinent is United States v. 
White, where the Court held that even misplaced expectations of trust (talking 
to an informant) are unprotected, despite the chilling effects it may have.168  
Thus, until recently, anything given to a third party, even if under a misplaced 
expectation of privacy, lacked constitutional protection.  
The Supreme Court however has begun to narrow the third-party 
doctrine,169  likely due to how much information is being sent to data 
companies. Described most succinctly in Justice Sotomayor’s Jones 
concurrence, there is a concern that so much of daily life is indispensably and 
inadvertently being shared that the third-party doctrine threatens to completely 
erase the Fourth Amendment.170  This issue notably arose in United States v. 
Carpenter, wherein the police used cell phone tracking technology to locate a 
defendant without a warrant.171  In a 5-4 holding, the Court held that despite 
an individual “giving” his location through his cell phone to a third-party (the 
cell tower companies), he still had a reasonable expectation of privacy.172  The 
Court recognized that expectations of privacy in the digital age produce new 
challenges that do not align with precedent, and that the personal “nature of 
 
 163 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).  The Court articulated the impact third parties 
have on one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  However, Miller did not address the distinction 
between essential and non-essential records nor the permissibility of DNA searches.  
 164 Id. at 436.  
 165 Id. at 442. 
 166 Id. at 440. 
 167 Id. at 440–441. 
 168 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971).  
 169 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2011).  
 170 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16.  
 171 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2212.  
 172 Id. at 2217.  
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the particular documents sought” carved out an exception to the third-party 
doctrine.173  This holding was bolstered by the indispensable nature of cell 
phones and the lack of voluntary affirmative action on the individual’s part.174  
In a broad reading of Carpenter’s holding, Professors Freiwald and 
Smith identified several factors that the Court used in defining its carve-out 
in addition to the classic Katz test: Whether the investigatory method was 
hidden, continuous in its tracking nature, indiscriminate in what information 
and how much information the police had access to, intrusive in revealing 
deeply personal information, and whether the expense of the search would 
allow law enforcement to obtain a tremendous amount of information that, if 
using more traditional techniques, would have taken much longer and cost 
much more to acquire.175  Using these factors, the Court reined in the third-
party doctrine, leaning on Riley176 to show that the assumption of risk 
framework inherent in the third-party doctrine is not mechanical, but rather 
has some components of voluntary and knowledgeable action.177  In the wake 
of Carpenter, Freiwald and Smith called for a “closer analysis when it comes 
to privately maintained databases of non-location information” as Carpenter 
“wipes out” the argument that information “merely by [its] storage with a 
third party, [is] immune from Fourth Amendment protection by virtue of the 
third-party doctrine.”178 
While Carpenter and Jones dealt with electronic tracking technology, there 
is other precedent that suggests the Court will not be willing to extend the third-
party doctrine to information given for diagnostic purposes.  In Ferguson v. 
City of Charleston, a hospital partnered with law enforcement to submit 
pregnant women’s blood given for diagnostic reasons to a forensic lab in order 
to test for cocaine content.179  The policy was designed to reduce cocaine usage 
among pregnant women, which was harming the unborn child, after previous 
attempts requiring mandatory therapy, education, and treatment were found 
ineffective.180  The Court held that this was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment despite the medical information being given to a third-party (the 
hospital) because of a patient’s reasonable expectation that medical 
 
 173 Id. at 2217–18.  
 174 Id. at 2218.  
 175 Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 205, 220–21 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 176 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (giving special protection to cell phones due to their 
indispensable and personal nature). 
 177 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 175, at 224–25.  
 178 Id. at 230.  
 179 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69–70.  
 180 Id. at 70.  
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information would not be disseminated without her consent.181  The Court 
further rejected any special needs exception noting the involvement of law 
enforcement at every step of the process, and the general interest in crime 
control.182  While not expressly stated, the Court may have also been weighing 
the negative externality of disincentivizing cocaine-using women from giving 
birth at a hospital.  
When considering the use of new technology for searches, it is also 
necessary to survive the Kyllo test.  There, police used a thermal imager to 
scan a house in search of marijuana-growing glow lamps.183  This technology 
was new at the time and was used without a warrant.184  The Court suppressed 
the information gathered because “[w]here . . . the Government uses a device 
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance 
is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”185  While 
homes generally have enhanced privacy protection, the concept of regularly-
used technology not triggering additional protections is potent in the present 
instance.  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
On what grounds could law enforcement gain access to the wealth of data 
that Ancestry, 23andMe, and other similar companies possess?  Do customers 
have any reasonable expectations of privacy in their information once given 
away?  What about in the case of FamilyTree, which was both named the best 
company for “strict privacy”186 and was the first to openly volunteer for FBI 
cooperation? 
A.  Police Use of Commercial DNA Banks Should be Constitutionally 
 
 181 Id. at 78.  
 182 Id. at 79–80; see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (internal citations 
omitted) (“The primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoints is in the end to advance 
‘the general interest in crime control.’  We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized 
suspicion . . . . ”). 
 183 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).  
 184 Id. at 30, 40.  
 185 Id. at 40. 
 186 Brad Berman, Best DNA Testing Kits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://health.usnews.com/wellness/articles/2019-01-07/best-dna-testing-kits; Dieter Holger, 
FamilyTreeDNA Review: Unique Genealogical Collaboration, But an Outdated Interface, 
PCWORLD (Dec. 14, 2018, 5:00AM PST), 
https://www.pcworld.com/article/3326568/familytreedna-review.html. 
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Permissible  
Following Katz, a court would need to find that someone, either the user 
or the company has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
DNA in order to gain the protections of the Fourth Amendment.  The court 
should hold that a user has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their DNA 
once it has been sent to a company, though with the recent narrowing of the 
third-party doctrine it is not completely obvious that the State has an 
overpowering interest.  The court should also hold that an individual does not 
have a claim for constitutional protection under the Kyllo framework nor a 
property interest in their DNA.  Further, the evidentiary defense that 
23andMe raised seems solvable with circumstantial evidence authenticating 
the sample and the testimony of the scientist who did the testing in accordance 
with Melendez-Diaz.187  However, the court should hold that the companies 
have a privacy interest, or at least that law enforcement will be required to 
conduct a pre-compliance review before a neutral party prior to accessing the 
genetic records.  
The most persuasive argument for cutting back the third-party doctrine for 
commercial DNA banks is the “personal nature of the information.”  The 
DNA samples sent in contain private medical facts, something that could give 
them some protection, as in Skinner.188  Applying the Carpenter factors 
identified by Freiwald and Smith leaves questions as to whether the third-party 
doctrine would even apply.  Certainly, commercial DNA searches would be 
hidden, done in secret, away from the public view.  The search would not be 
continuous but would be inarguably indiscriminate in the amount of people 
captured by the search (especially considering benign family members), and 
intrusive given the personal nature of genetic material.  Finally, DNA testing 
is becoming increasingly cheap and quick, implicating the expense factor.189  
The court could also look to Ferguson to carve out a third-party exception.  
There, the Supreme Court found patients to have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information given for diagnostic purposes.190  Similarly, many people 
undergo genetic testing in order to discover potential illnesses and submit their 
DNA for research purposes, which society should not disincentivize.191  
Finally, due to the privacy statements provided by the companies, the 
 
 187 Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009). 
 188 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. 
 189 Murphy, supra note 66.  
 190 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.  
 191 23andMe, supra note 156. 
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individuals certainly have a subjective expectation of privacy that their 
information will not be disseminated. 
The court should find however that the third-party doctrine does extend 
to commercial DNA banks.  Inarguably, customers of these companies took 
an affirmative action in giving away their information to a third-party.  The 
customers consented to the storage and use of the data, and their misplaced 
trust in a company that they were told was the best for “strict privacy” would 
be an inadequate argument under White.192  Further cutting against the 
rationale of the Carpenter majority that carved out a modern-age exception to 
the third-party doctrine, there is nothing “essential” or “indispensable” about 
DNA tests.  Cell phones are ubiquitous and necessary to modern life; they 
contain pictures, addresses, and are how we contact loved ones in 
emergencies.  They even gain heightened protection compared almost any 
other object.193  The court should not find that this is the case for DNA tests.  
Customers did not need to give their DNA to a company in the same way that 
a soon-to-be mother is vulnerable to a doctor’s orders.  In response to the 
“personal nature of the information” argument, if law enforcement only 
requested the information obtained from the “junk” DNA, then this argument 
is unlikely to be persuasive, as no private medical information will be 
disclosed.  Additionally, the DNA sample could be thought of as an element 
of the commercial transaction and therefore, also receive no constitutional 
protection.194  The court should also not recognize a Kyllo argument to find a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, because at this point the general public is 
using DNA testing.195   
With respect to the property theory of the Fourth Amendment, it is 
similarly unlikely that a consumer could make a successful property claim on 
their DNA once it is given away.196  In Moore v. Regents of California, a 
physician-scientist at UCLA took diagnostic samples of Moore’s blood and 
bone marrow and unbeknownst to Moore, used them for research.197  Moore’s 
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cells turned out to be scientifically and commercially significant, leading to 
substantial profit and many discoveries, so Moore brought suit claiming he 
had a property right to his cells.198  The Supreme Court of California found 
that Moore had no property rights to his discarded cells or to the research or 
profits made from the cell lines.  The court rejected the argument that 
someone has an absolute right to the unique products of their body.199  
The commercial DNA companies here are using the DNA for research 
and commercial purposes.  Further, the informed consent here is being done 
in much more comprehensive ways than in Moore.  While customers can 
request their DNA profiles to be deleted, this is not true if the profiles are 
being used for research, which is the case for many of the profiles.  A court is 
unlikely to find that customers have any property interest in their abandoned 
DNA.  
One issue to note is the potential mitigation of Fourteenth Amendment 
claims with the proliferation of police use of commercial DNA databases.  
Due to the underrepresentation of African-American and Native American 
samples in the commercial databases, police currently actually have a much 
more powerful database for investigating wealthier, white suspects.  While this 
would not alleviate the concerns against religious groups, the continued lack 
of discriminatory intent would ultimately defeat any such claim. 
With respect to 23andMe’s chain-of-custody argument, this appears to be 
a solvable problem with good police and prosecutorial work.  Matching the 
user (who sent in the sample) to the buyer (who purchased the sample) could 
be confirmed through witness interviews, or at least provide a lead through the 
purchaser who might know the user.  With respect to testimony in court, the 
initial DNA sample was not analyzed in preparation for use at a judicial 
proceeding, so it is unlikely to be held to be testimonial and therefore trigger 
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.200  Even if it were analyzed for 
such a purpose, 23andMe stated that it has had five requests by law 
enforcement since 2007.  It would not be an intolerable burden for a scientist 
(or the law enforcement forensic scientist who ran the CODIS match) to testify 
to the procedure’s accuracy.201  Commercial DNA database users are unlikely 
to have any constitutional protections in their submitted samples.  The data 
was freely and affirmatively given, and their misplaced trust does not protect 
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them.  Nor will the users’ families have any constitutional protections involving 
the user’s DNA for the same reasons mentioned above in the familial search 
analysis.202   
Finally, there are the privacy rights of the companies themselves to 
consider.  Given the economic power that comes from the privacy and security 
of genetic data, it is clear that the companies have an interest in keeping that 
information secure.203  The case most analogous to this situation is City of Los 
Angeles v. Patel, in which the Los Angeles Code required hotels to retain the 
information of their guests for up to 90 days.204  If the hotel failed to do so or 
failed to turn over the records to the police upon request, the owner faced 
criminal penalties.205  The Supreme Court struck down this policy, holding it 
an unreasonable search and seizure.206  It held that in order to conduct a 
warrantless search of a hotel, there must be some sort of pre-compliance 
review before a neutral party.207  While the Court recognized the hotel’s 
interest in its records, it did not expressly recognize that the hotel had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Rather, this case turned on whether the 
hotel industry fell under the administrative search “special needs” exception 
by being a “closely-regulated industry.”208  A closely-regulated industry is one 
that presents a clear and significant risk to public welfare such as firearms, 
mining, or running an automobile junkyard.209  DNA companies do not fall 
into this category, and as such will  be able to require some pre-compliance 
review before any information is provided.  As Ancestry and 23andMe both 
note that they require subpoenas or a warrant before they turn over any 
information, it is likely that they would support this argument.210  
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CONCLUSION 
Familial DNA searching is still new, but we have seen numerous examples 
of damaging false positives, including from commercial DNA banks.211  
Beyond just DNA searches, the bungled 2006 Duke Lacrosse investigation212 
and the Reddit witch-hunt213  in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon 
Bombings illustrate the destructive cloud of suspicion that mishandled 
investigations can cause.  Even if the investigation is handled correctly, an 
unknown family link, or lack thereof could damage a family in a way that is 
not legally cognizable.  Yet the positives surely outweigh the danger.  
Murderers have been caught, innocent people have been exonerated, and the 
DNA searching technology will only become more accurate.  Familial DNA 
searching, even using commercial databanks, is not a practice that should be 
done away with.  
Since there is unlikely to be constitutional protection given to the users or 
their family members, and only limited protection given to companies, it is up 
to the legislatures to enact regulations and protections at all levels of 
government.  While the state of genetic surveillance in the U.S. is nowhere 
near the nightmare that is China,214 the lack of regulations at the local level has 
led to increased surveillance of innocent people.215  Local databases “are 
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designed with the assumption that they will ultimately include a large number 
of DNA profiles from people who will never be linked to a crime.”216   
Moving forward, legislatures should adopt the European approach, where 
law enforcement cannot use an investigative method until it has been 
authorized by statute.217  At the minimum, there should be a uniform set of 
regulations in order to minimize silver-plattering.218  Legislatures must rise to 
the challenge.  They must enact regulations to provide better notice to those 
who volunteer their data for non-law enforcement purposes and to protect 
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